Varieties of Capitalism and post-Keynesian economics on Euro crisis

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1. Introduction

The 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) that began in the US housing sector mutated into a sovereign debt crisis and economic depression for countries in southern Europe, threatening the very existence of the Euro zone. The translation of the financial crisis into a sovereign debt crisis was specific to Europe and did not happen in the USA, UK or Japan. After the GFC, the government budget deficits in the South increased due to automatic stabilizers, as part of countercyclical policy or because of bank rescue measures, thus increasing the government debt to GDP ratios. From 2007 onwards the spreads on government bond yields of Greece, Ireland and Spain increased gradually until in 2009 Greece revealed that it had failed to meet its public debt targets. This sparked a crisis of confidence in sovereign debt which spilled over to Spain, Portugal and Ireland where public deficits were high and ultimately led to the shutting down of access of governments to private financial markets. Emergency lending facilities (EFSF and EFSM) had to be established. The following bailout packages entailed policies of austerity and structural reforms imposed by the Troika i.e. the European Commission (EC), European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Throughout southern Europe this led to a deep recession and further real GDP losses. The unemployment rate in the South remained as high as 20% in 2016. While the political narrative of the troika institutions has remained that the crisis was a result of fiscal irresponsibility on the part of southern countries, thus imposing stricter austerity measures, the scholarship in comparative political economy has tried to identify the underlying economic causes of the sovereign debt crisis and the specificities of the capitalist economies that led to it.

The aim of this paper is to compare and contrast analyses of the Euro crisis based on the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) and post-Keynesian (PK) approach. VoC is a prominent theory in comparative political economy, which is at the intersection of political science and economics (but usually located within the former). Post-Keynesian Economics is a heterodox economic theory, which offers an analysis of growth regimes and financializa-
tion. The VoC analysis has consistently highlighted the current account imbalances between the Coordinated Market Economies (CME) of the North and the Mediterranean Market Economies (MME) in the South as a result of the institutional asymmetries of heterogeneous countries bound in a common monetary union. The focus of this scholarship has been on the lack of institutional capacities in the South to restrain wages and promote export-competitiveness. Thus the euro crisis is ultimately a crisis of incompatible institutional settings, in particular wage bargaining institutions, being tied together in a monetary union. On the other hand, the post-Keynesian analysis has interpreted the crisis as an outcome of the unsustainable growth models and neoliberal policies in Europe; i.e. a neo-mercantilist export-driven demand regime in the North and a debt-fueled consumption demand regime in South and the EMU policies of financial deregulation that accompanied European economic integration. Similar imbalances played themselves out in world economy at large but have not resulted in a sovereign debt crisis. What is specific to the Euro area is the absence of any adequate fiscal stabilization or effective lender of last resort facility for the member countries. While the central banks of the USA and UK effectively underwrote government borrowing as part of the quantitative easing program, the ECB was hesitant in its unconventional monetary policy and began buying government bonds of countries under pressure only at a late stage of the crises. Consequently, these imbalances resulted in a full blown sovereign debt crisis. We will argue that the VoC analysis has important shortcomings as it focuses excessively on labour market institutions, lacks an adequate treatment of finance and downplays the significance of fiscal policy and that the post-Keynesian approach integrates financial factors and economic policy in explaining the crisis.

The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we describe the basic foundations of the VoC approach and its respective typologies of CME, LME and MME based on how countries resolve their coordination problem. Section 3 then details the VoC analysis of the Euro crisis and its core arguments about institutional asymmetry and competitiveness and the role of European institutions in the crisis. Section 4 introduces the post-Keynesian macroeconomic framework with its focus on demand and distribution and section 5 proceeds to the explanation of the Euro crisis based on unsustainable growth models and financialization, contingent on deflationary policies of the EMU. Section 6 provides a summary of the macroeconomics underlying the VoC analysis and its recent extension to include growth models and the debate surrounding it. Section 6 concludes by contrasting both the approaches and their respective policy implications, highlighting the potential of the growth model approach based on post-Keynesian economics.
2. The Varieties of Capitalism approach

Within the comparative political economy literature, the VoC approach has provided the canonical explanation of the Euro crisis based on the strategic interaction of agents and economies’ comparative institutional advantage affecting their macroeconomic outcomes. Unlike traditional trade theory that focuses on comparative advantage, the VoC analysis extends this basic insight to focus on comparative *institutional* advantage. The focus of the analysis is on the supply-side institutions that characterize and anchor a particular type of economy and how economies solve their coordination problems. Using this framework, the sovereign debt crisis is interpreted as the result of the interaction of two features: specific institutional foundations of structurally heterogeneous economies with their comparative advantage and the policy architecture of the European and Monetary Union (EMU) with a fixed exchange rate and a common monetary policy. Before we provide a detailed VoC explanation of the Euro crisis, we review the analytical foundations of the VoC approach.

The VoC approach is conceived as a synthesis and extension to the existing analytical frameworks that have dominated the study of comparative political economy. These are the modernization approach, that stresses the role of state in modernizing industry and securing high growth, the neocorporatist approach which highlights the state’s capacity to negotiate and bargain with/between employers and trade unions regarding social and economic policy and finally the social systems of production theory which analyses production regimes, national innovation and sectoral governance systems that depend on collective institutions at different levels. While each of these theories offer important insights, they are inadequate by themselves in understanding how institutions affect behavior and the strategic interactions between economic agents. The VoC approach provides a synthesis of these approaches on the basis of rational choice-theoretic foundations that locates the firm at the center of the analysis. The analysis stresses the importance of strategic interaction between economic agents mediated through institutions in explaining macroeconomic outcomes. Institutions are understood here as the rules of the game or matrices of incentives and sanctions that determine the behavior of agents. Therefore the foundation of the VoC approach is a relational view of the firm that strategically coordinates in the areas of corporate governance, industrial relations, vocational training and inter-firm relations and tries to develop its core competencies and dynamic capacities to make profits.

The institutional means by which firms resolve these economic and political coordination problems determines the type of economy. Coordinated market economies (CME), with Germany and Japan as prime examples, are characterized by non-market forms of interaction and bank-based fi-
nance whereas liberal market economies (LME), such as the USA and the UK, rely on market mechanisms and market-finance to solve collective action problems. In CME’s, firms develop extensive relational contracting, network monitoring based on private information and reliance on collaborative efforts to build core competencies. Whereas, in LME’s firm resort to hierarchies and competitive market arrangements based on price signals to coordinate their activity and develop core competencies. More recently, the VoC approach has extended its analysis to the southern countries of Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece and has developed a hybrid typology between CME’s and LME’s namely; Mediterranean/Mixed market economies (MME). These economies have limited coordinating capacities in labour relations and are characterized by a high degree of state intervention and clientilistic relationships. These southern economies exhibit a dualism between formal and informal sectors, where the former has strong employment protection and benefits whereas the latter is unregulated and has low wages and benefits. These broad typologies are then conceived of as national institutional equilibria from which rational agents have no incentive to deviate.

The presence of institutional complementarities i.e. the presence of one set of institutions increasing the efficiency of other institutions, tends to reinforce the difference between these typologies. Firms in CME’s pursue production strategies that offer skilled workers long term employment contracts at industry-based wages. These practices are themselves feasible because of a dense network of inter-firm monitoring system and corporate governance regime where firms have access to capital without pressure to pay dividends to shareholders and they can invest in vocational training programs and R&D. Due to the presence of such institutions, firms pursue production strategies that promote high value-added exports. On the other hand, the southern MME economies lack most of these capacities for wage bargaining and corporate governance and rely on the export of price-sensitive, low quality goods and domestic demand to make profits.

A critical aspect of institutional complementarity is the fact that different country groupings will pursue only those macroeconomic policies that are complementary or incentive compatible to the coordinating capacities embedded in the political economy. CME’s with their systems of coordinated wage bargaining have a rational preference for non-accommodating monetary policy oriented to a hard exchange rate which provides a credible commitment to producers that wage increases will not be accommodated by devaluations. This is further complemented by a tight fiscal policy that limits the public sector wage increases so as to keep the real exchange rate competitive and promote exports. On the other hand, the MME countries have a rational preference for an accommodative monetary policy and a fiscal policy stance that promotes domestic demand. These prefer-
ences also explain the strategic rational interest of the North and South to come together in a common EMU. For the export-led economies of the North, the common currency regime ruled out competitive exchange rate devaluations from the Southern countries, especially from France, Italy and Spain as the North was concerned about its competitiveness outside the Eurozone. For the demand-led Southern economies, the common currency regime guaranteed low inflation and low interest rates, and therefore domestic investment and demand which allowed it to catch up in terms of developing its welfare state. Therefore, in the first decade of the common currency area the Eurozone operated a successful dual growth model based on the common mutual interest of the North and the South. This was to change after the financial crisis of 2008 as Europe descended into a sovereign debt crisis and a deep economic recession.

3. Varieties of Capitalism and the Euro crisis

The Euro crisis is characterized by two stylized facts. First, high private and public indebtedness in the Southern economies of Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland. Second, a lack of price and product competitiveness in these economies as they generated large intra-Eurozone macroeconomic imbalances. The VoC’s important contribution lies in explaining how and why these macroeconomic imbalances in the Euro zone emerged. In doing so it usually distinguishes itself from the optimum currency area (OCA) literature and the political narrative of the crisis being a crisis of fiscal profligacy. In the VoC narrative, the euro crisis was a result of different varieties of capitalism bound together in a single monetary union. Specifically it is the institutional asymmetries and the long-term structural problems that led to a growing trade imbalance between the North and South. These imbalances were accompanied by the high accumulation of private debt initially, followed by public debt in the South, to which the spreads on sovereign debt became more sensitive to, thus leading to the crisis. Moreover, the absence of an external adjustment mechanism for the Southern economies and the lack of a banking union or/and fiscal union in Euro zone exacerbated the crisis. In essence, the core of the VoC argument is that contingent on the monetary regime, the crisis was a result of institutional asymmetries, especially labour market institutions in the South that led to inflationary wage settlements in the public sector and a loss of competitiveness and therefore intra-Eurozone macroeconomic imbalances.

The distinguishing feature of the VoC analysis is its institutional account of the crisis. The MME’s are characterized by limited capacities in the sphere of corporate governance and labour relations and lack two crucial
elements when compared to CME’s export-led growth model. These are capacities for wage restraint and inter-sectoral wage coordination. Iversen and Soskice (2013), Hall (2017), Johnston et al, (2014) argue that the crisis was a result of the asymmetry in competitiveness arising from different countries’ institutional capacities to limit sheltered wage growth relative to the manufacturing export sector wage growth. Johnston et al (2014) use a fixed effects panel regression model of 17 countries from 1980 to 2007 to test for the relationship between sheltered wage suppression and export performance. They use a random effects model for the sectoral wage-governance dummy regression and argue that countries with pattern and peak level bargaining systems where exposed sectors lead wage developments, and countries with incomes policies/social pacts have performed well in wage moderation. Hancke (2013a) too locates the roots of the crisis in the fact that unit labour costs in the public and the manufacturing sectors diverged rapidly in countries where the exporting manufacturing sector was not leading in wage setting, and the public sector unions had extricated themselves from the national wage setting process. This is attributed to the fact that formal sector unions are fragmented and also because the workers in the formal sectors are protected by employment legislation and not threatened by the risk of unemployment.7 Focusing on the institutional foundations of MME, Hassel (2014) argues that organized interests in MME’s use their resources to lobby for state protection and compensation. The state plays a central role in coordination and also adjustment in the face of external pressures, where firms seek protection and compensation from the state.8 It is these clientelistic practices of compensation, product market regulation and employment protection that tend to produce uncoordinated wage-setting and diverging unit labour costs.

As discussed in the previous section, one of the critical aspects of institutional complementarity is the macroeconomic policy adopted and accordingly the CME’s have a rational preference for non-accommodating monetary policy underpinning their export-led growth model. Given that the wage-setting in MME is uncoordinated, monetary and fiscal policy cannot be used to disincentivize inflationary wage settlements as in the case of CME’s. Adopting a non-accommodating monetary policy in MME’s would simply lead to unemployment by depressing domestic demand which is the main driver of growth in Southern economies. Johnston and Regan (2016) use a cross-sectional, time series regression of 14 EU countries from 1980 to 2012 to test how different currency regimes interact with countries’ inflation and nominal exchange rate regime in influencing its current account balance. They argue that the underlying asymmetry and incompatibility of export-led and domestic demand-led growth regimes is strictly contingent upon the EMU monetary regime of inflation targeting. Since domestic inflation is a weighted average of sheltered public sector
and export manufacturing sector, inflationary pressures tend to build up when the exposed export sector does not lead wage developments. This is more so the case then the export manufacturing sector fails to offset the rising public sector wages either due to its low-value added exports, or by being relatively small in size to the public sector, or by setting its own wages above productivity levels.

The lack of wage bargaining coordination in the South and absence of inflation convergence institutions in EU led to persistent inflation differentials between the South and the North which set in motion two important mechanisms. First, lower inflation in the North reduced its real exchange rate against the south, expanding its trade surpluses. Second, high inflation in the south further lowered its real interest rate and promoted domestic investment. In a second round feedback effect, low interest rates in the south also feeds into higher growth, thus fueling asset prices and wage inflation. In line with their growth models monetary and fiscal policy were also more restrictive in the north, thus further reducing relative export prices in the North. The North and the South were on divergent tracks of inflation and competitiveness. Hancke (2013a) argues that underlying this divergent, cumulative process are two completely different systems of wage setting in the North, which controls inflation by wage coordination, and the South which cannot do so. Consequently in the South, wage inflation keeps rising faster and the competitiveness of the real sector keeps declining, due to what is effectively an appreciation of the real exchange rate in a monetary union when the possibility of periodic devaluations are ruled out. The absence of adjustment mechanisms; nominal exchange rates in the South and national central banks in the North, that could produce inflation convergence among diverse EMU members led to growing macroeconomic imbalances to which the spreads on sovereign debt became sensitive to.

The VoC literature recognizes that financial booms were building in several southern countries, but these do not play the prime role in their analysis. For example Hall (2018, p. 3) argues: “Financial turmoil in the wake of a credit boom certainly played a major role. But [it] cannot explain why these booms and the subsequent crisis of confidence in sovereign debt were more pronounced in some countries than others.” The answer of VoC for this lies in the labour relations systems. The booms were due to the low interest rates caused by the common currencies and were reinforced by “European financial institutions [that] recycle[d] the funds generated by growing northern trade surpluses into them with seeming disregard for the accompanying risks”. The term recycling implies that the trade surpluses existed prior to and independent of the capital flows and financial boom in the south. While Hall (2018, p. 10) notes that “a central bank capable of purchasing sovereign debt might have staved off the initial crisis of confi-
dence”, ECB policies play no major role in the VoC explanation of the sovereign debt crisis. Fiscal policy is not at the centre of VoC analysis and while Troika-imposed austerity is recognized as unhelpful, no serious attempt is made to quantify its impact. Demands for a European fiscal policy are, while in principle desirable, are regarded as unrealistic as the different countries have different fiscal policy strategies according to their labour relations systems.

In substance, the VoC approach stresses the role of diverging competitiveness due to differences in wage coordinating institutions accompanied by a pro-cyclical monetary policy as the *causa causans* of macroeconomic imbalances, and hence the Eurocrisis. A common monetary policy with a single inflation target for the whole of the EMU implied that Southern countries with higher inflation had lower real interest rates and Northern countries with low inflation rates have higher real interest rates. The stability and growth pact (SGP) also limits the South in its ability to use fiscal expenditures as a countercyclical stabilizer while the budget of the EU is too small for stabilization. Therefore, the cornerstone of the VoC argument, thus rests on differences in wage moderation. As Hancke (2013b) summarizes, the problem of EMU is one of current account imbalances, and at the heart of these imbalances lie two very different systems of labour and employment relations.

4. Post-Keynesian economics: demand, distribution and finance

Post-Keynesian economics is a research paradigm that takes Keynes’s ideas of effective demand, uncertainty and money seriously even in the long-run, which is in contrast to the (old) neoclassical synthesis and the New-Keynesian synthesis which reduces their role to short-run phenomena with the long run governed by a full employment (or natural rate) general equilibrium. Post-Keynesian economics developed as a radical alternative to the neoclassical synthesis and rejects the latter’s claim to generality and the reductionism entailed by methodological individualism. Instead, Post-Keynesian economics begins with social classes as the unit of analysis to address questions of income distribution, which in turn become important for its theory of output and inflation.

The core principle of PKE is effective demand which asserts that the level of demand will determine the amount of output and employment and that persistent involuntary unemployment is due to the lack of demand, even in the long run. The amount of employment is therefore determined in the goods markets, and not the labour market. The economy is also considered demand-led in the long run due to unemployment hysteresis and other path dependency mechanisms such as dynamic returns to scale,
learning by doing and induced technological progress. In this regard, post-Keynesian macroeconomics differs sharply from New Keynesian macroeconomics that underlies recent VoC analysis. While New Keynesian macroeconomics allows for demand to play an important role in the short run, supply-side factors most of which are anchored in labour market institutions play the core role in the medium and long run. An important contribution in developing the post-Keynesian analysis of demand formation is by Bhaduri and Marglin (1991) who develop a typology of demand regimes based on the effect of income distribution on aggregate demand. Two important assumptions underlie their analysis of demand regimes. First, there is unutilized capacity in the economy. Second, the propensity to consume of workers is higher than the capitalists. As a result, an increase in the wage share has a positive effect on consumption, a negative effect on investment since lower profits lead to lower investments and a negative effect on exports since higher wages imply a loss of competitiveness. The net effect of an increase in wage share on aggregate demand is therefore not determined a priori and depends on the relative size of these partial effects. If the consumption effect outweighs the investment and export effect, then the total (net) effect is positive and the demand regime is wage led. If the total effect is negative, then the demand regime is said to be profit led.12 On the basis of this framework, post-Keynesian economics develops different types of growth model based on the sensitivity of investment to changes in the wage share.

A second important feature of PKE is the central role assigned to uncertainty and money. PKE regards fundamental, irreducible uncertainty as a pervasive and inescapable feature of capitalist economies and hence assigns a significant role to money as a store of value. The PK analysis builds on, and extends the monetary production economy framework where money is not neutral and affects current output and employment levels when it is held as a liquid asset that bridges a known present and an unknown future. Money is created by private banks and institutions while its origin lies in the state which has coercive powers to establish it as a legal tender. The process of money creation in PKE is endogenous and money is created when banks lend to firms and households. The lending decisions of banks create equivalent deposits when firms and households spend. Thus in PK theory, money is endogenously created and loans create deposits reversing the causation in orthodox economic theory. This closely follows the Keynesian logic of investment leading savings and the lending process tends to be pro-cyclical over the course of a business cycle. The analysis of financing conditions and leverage becomes important as changes in these tend to endogenously generate business cycles.13 In recent years, post-Keynesian economics has developed an extensive analysis of financialization and financial instability.14 Financial fac-
tors, in as much as they endogenously generate financial instability through changes in debt ratios, and credit bubbles caused due to the lending decisions of banks, play a central role in the PK analysis of crises.

Building on the PK macroeconomic analysis of demand regimes and finance, Stockhammer et al. (2016) have proposed a distinctive approach to international political economy that incorporates elements from Economic Geography for groupings of growth models, French regulation theory for understanding institutions and working class restructuring based on social compromises and ideas from neo-Gramscian political economy regarding a trans-European ruling class. Such an approach is close to the variegated capitalism framework and highlights the conflictive nature of capitalist economies and the national social forces within, and international interdependencies across capitalist economies. In the next section, we will detail the post-Keynesian explanation of the Euro crisis building on the central role of demand and finance.

5. Post-Keynesian Economics and the Euro crisis

The PK analysis interprets the European sovereign debt crisis as a joint outcome of the operation of unsustainable growth models in the Eurozone and its economic policy architecture. The operation of two inherently unsustainable growth models led to increasing private debt-ratios and current account imbalances. The shift towards financial deregulation in a common currency area with diverging competitiveness led to the buildup of these imbalances. In this Post-Keynesian account, the specificity of the Euro crisis that distinguishes it from the GFC and other crises is that; it is the dysfunctional policy architecture in Europe, especially the separation of monetary and fiscal policy spheres that led to a full blown sovereign debt crisis. Moreover, the pursuance of austerity/deflationary policies by European policymakers has exacerbated the crisis and has pushed southern Europe in a deep recession. In this section, we will give an account of the crisis, building on the growth model approach and post-Keynesian analysis of finance and elaborate how EU’s policy architecture has amplified the crisis.

The origin of the Eurozone crisis lies in the operation of two inherently unsustainable growth models in the North and the South of Europe i.e. a neo-mercantalist export-driven growth model in the Northern countries of Germany, Sweden, Austria, and the Netherlands and a debt-driven growth model in the southern European countries and Ireland. In the North, it is export surpluses that have driven growth (and realized profits) whereas in the South it is debt-financed consumption and residential investment that has driven growth, based on real estate booms. Both these models are in-
herently unstable because they require increasing debt to income ratios that are prone to fragility. In the South, it is the increasing amounts of domestic debt, especially household debt and credit for residential investment that allows for consumption driven growth, whereas in the North it is the rising foreign debt of trade partners that can sustain export surpluses. The EU’s policy of a single financial market and deregulated finance meant uniform interest rates across Europe and massive capital flows from the North to South, thus fueling faster growth on a property price boom in countries like Spain and Ireland. Consequently, the South experienced substantial wage and price inflation which led to rising unit labour costs and a loss of competitiveness. From 2000 to 2008, unit labour costs in the South grew on average more than 24% as compared to euro zone average of 16% with Germany’s unit labour costs growing at only 3%. As unit labour costs diverged between North and South, accompanied by fast growth in the South due to rapid credit expansion, the current account imbalances increased rapidly from 2000 onwards given the fixed exchange rate policy of EU and the absence of devaluation as an external adjustment mechanism. The debt-driven growth model in the South and the export-led growth model in the North became symbiotic as the South imported goods from the North and the export surpluses from the North were recycled as private credit flows to the South, where they financed asset price bubbles.

In the VoC analysis, current account imbalances are squarely accounted for by the divergence in competitiveness and rising unit labour costs in the South. This leads the VoC authors to conclude in the final analysis that it is the lack of institutional capacities for wage restraint that is responsible for the imbalances. This solitary focus on unit labour costs is questioned by some post-Keynesian authors. Storm and Naastepad (2015) argue that real unit labour costs (RULC) do not matter at all due to the “Kaldor Paradox”, and what matters is non-price, technological competitiveness and high-tech productive capabilities. Onaran and Galanis (2012) estimate the impact of RULC on export and import growth. While the elasticity of imports with respect to RULC is not significant, the elasticity of exports with respect to RULC is only 0.06 in the Euro zone area. Given the limited sensitivity of exports, they conclude that relative unit labour costs do not matter much. Guschanski and Stockhammer (2017), extending the analysis beyond the Euro zone countries to 28 OECD countries between 1971 and 2014 find that both competitiveness, measured by unit labour costs, and asset prices, especially movements in property prices, account for the current account imbalances. But since 1996 financial flows become more important as they were driven by property prices and stock prices. Overall, the picture that emerges is that real unit labour costs played a secondary role and the external imbalances in Euro zone arose as a consequence of
strong domestic demand, spurred by credit boom in the South fueled by
the flow of private capital from the North and Anglo-Saxon countries.

The role of money and finance thus becomes critical to understanding
the Eurozone crisis and the buildup of external imbalances. In fact, the cri-
isis is yet another instance of the crisis of finance dominated capitalism and
European integration along neoliberal lines which has entailed rising in-
come inequalities and financialization. The process of financialization
has impacted each of the Eurozone countries differently which have expe-
rienced different forms of working class restructuring. Financialization af-
fects both households and firms through increasing household debt and
shareholder value orientation respectively. The South experienced a re-

gime of social compromise backed by financialization which allowed mod-
erate wage increases and the welfare state to develop. The impact of
financialization on demand formation in the South has been substantial
and has allowed for debt-led consumption growth. The debt-to-income of
the households has increased massively in the South (on average) and in-
creased by 45.9% from 2000 to 2008, while property prices grew 41.7% in
the South. Unlike VoC which purely focuses on finance for business in-
vestment, the post-Keynesian analysis highlights the role of speculative
flows of capital that generated a property price bubble. Capital inflows from
Anglo-Saxon countries as well as from France and Germany, fuelled a
bubble in real estate markets in the South, which in turn fuelled household
debt and consumption. This led to the worsening of their net international
investment position as debtor countries. In the North, compared to the
South household debt increased only by 9.7% and property prices by
2.1%. The debt overhang in the South made the countries more suscep-
tible to financial crisis especially so in the absence of national control over
monetary policy to ensure financial stability.

Finally, the specificity of the Eurocrisis in this post-Keynesian interpreta-
tion is the dysfunctional policy architecture of the EU that allowed the crisis
to exacerbate. While the United States adopted counter-cyclical fiscal pol-
icy and quantitative easing after the GFC, the economic policy in Europe
was stifled and turned towards austerity. The economic policy of the EU is
embodied in the Maastricht Treaty, the Stability and Growth Pact and the
Lisbon Treaty. The Maastricht treaty enshrines the setting up of the EMU
with a common currency and common monetary policy with price stability
and inflation targeting as the mandate at around 2%. Fiscal policy, on the
other hand is controlled nationally and is constrained by the SGP which re-
stricts the member countries' budget deficit at 3% of the GDP while the
ECB's budget is restricted to 2% per annum which is inadequate for any
counter-cyclical stabilization role during crises. Unlike the U.S the lack of
these two important institutional mechanisms allowed the crisis to exacer-
bate. First, the creation of EMU separated the fiscal and monetary policy
spheres, where the ECB’s independence is strengthened by not allowing it to directly fund national governments. This in essence means that the lender of last resort facility is not available to national governments and there is no explicit guarantor of the public debt of member states. Therefore member countries could not monetize their debt if needed, since the government issued debt is in the common currency, the euro. Since countries do not have control of monetary policy, not only can they not set interest rates, but in a situation of sovereign debt crisis, they cannot rely on ECB to act as the lender of last resort for the government. The implication of this is that the ECB, due its very policy design, becomes a lender of last resort for the private sector only because it does not buy government bonds but extends a range of credit facilities to private institutions. In the euro crisis, the consequence of this separation of monetary and fiscal policy spheres was that the private institutions and commercial banks stared speculating against the government that had rescued them.\textsuperscript{20} The second important institutional deficiency of the euro zone is that, the SGP put a cap on public spending and ruled out fiscal transfers in between the member states. This restricts member states from pursuing necessary expansionary fiscal policy especially in the South during the time of a deep recession. Furthermore, the Troika has imposed harsh austerity measures as part of its rescue packages. Furthermore, the “Fiscal compact” and the “Europlus compact” restricts structural deficits by introducing breaks in member countries’ constitutions. This policy architecture of the EU was criticized early on by post-Keynesians for its deflationary bias and placing the burden of adjustment only on the downward flexibility of wages to improve output and employment,\textsuperscript{21} and it is this policy architecture that translated the financial crisis into a sovereign debt crisis.

To summarize the post-Keynesian explanation of the crisis. The origin of the crisis lies in the operation of two inherently unsustainable growth models which allowed the build up of debt and was prone to fragility. Current account imbalances developed due to the project of European integration which allowed financial flows from the North to the South along with a loss of competitiveness in the South. In an attempt to stabilize the private sector, the amount of public debt by Southern economies grew drastically becoming susceptible to speculation, in turn, by the private sector. The policy architecture of the Euro zone and its implied separation of monetary and fiscal policy spheres meant that monetary policy was paralyzed to guarantee public debt, thus effectively becoming a lender of last resort for private institutions, while fiscal policy was restrictive by design to act as a countercyclical stabilization tool and turned towards austerity measures thus hauling Southern Europe in a deep recession.
6. The Macroeconomics of Comparative Political Economy

There have been recent appeals to bring back macroeconomics in comparative political economy analysis by Soskice (2007), Hope and Soskice (2016) and Blyth and Mathijs (2017). In this context, Baccaro and Pontusson (2016) propose an alternative analytical framework to the VoC approach that builds on post-Keynesian macroeconomics and focuses on the relative importance of the different components of aggregate demand as drivers of economic growth. By identifying growth drivers or the components of aggregate demand and their interrelations, this approach identifies various growth models, for instance export-led growth and consumption-led growth. While not offering a typology of capitalist economies, the growth model perspective is conceived of as an alternative to the VoC approach with emphasis on demand and distributional conflict.

In light of the euro crisis, recent developments within the VoC approach have extended the analysis to focus on the different growth models underlying different economies i.e. countries with different varieties of capitalism tend to operate different growth models. Hall (2018) understands growth models slightly differently from Baccaro and Pontusson as “alternative approaches to securing economic growth, based on the ways in which the organization of political economy encourages the production of certain types of goods”.

In response to Baccaro and Pontusson’s claim of providing an alternative to VoC, Hope and Sockice (2016) argue that the growth model approach is not inconsistent with their VoC approach and argue that the export-led and consumption-led growth regimes corresponds with their classification of CME’s and LME’s respectively. They reject the claim by Baccaro and Pontusson that post-Fordist regimes (Sweden and Germany) are on different growth trajectories by rejecting their empirical claim that German exports have become more price-sensitive over time due to wage suppression as compared to Sweden. Moreover, Hope and Soskice suggest that the demand and distribution factors that the growth model approach highlights can be suitably incorporated within the “realistic” three equation model of new-Keynesian macroeconomics and has the added advantage of explaining macroeconomic demand management, including monetary and fiscal policy.

In view of the debate on growth model approach as an alternative framework of comparative political economy analysis, it must be emphasized that the distinguishing feature of this approach is the centrality of demand and distribution, characteristic of post-Keynesian macroeconomics. The Post-Keynesian approach builds on the Bhaduri-Marglin model to analyze the impact of a change in income distribution on aggregate demand. Specifically, it analyses the net effect of an increase in wage share on aggregate demand depending on the investment elasticity of profits.
to Hope and Soskice’s assertion that the growth model approach is not inconsistent with New-Keynesian macroeconomics, the PK analysis differs on crucially important theoretical points and conceives of the trajectory of different growth regimes within Euro zone as unsustainable.

First, income distribution is conspicuously absent from the new-Keynesian, three equation macroeconomic model that Hope and Soskice propose.\textsuperscript{24} The effect of income distribution on aggregate demand is completely ignored by this model. The standard post-Keynesian assumption of consumption propensity of wages being higher than profits leads to substantively different conclusions than the new-Keynesian, three equation model. Particularly, an increase in the wage share will have a positive effect on output and employment. From the post-Keynesian perspective, the VoC analysis of growth regimes implicitly assumes a profit-led demand regime where a reduction in wages (wage moderation) leads to positive employment and growth effects. It is implicitly assumed that all profits will be reinvested and a reduction in wage share will automatically lead to more investment via an increase in profits. Second, the macroeconomics underpinning VoC analysis focuses only on supply-side factors such as labour market institutions, corporate finance systems, vocational training, R&D etc. These supply-side factors serve as the basis for the institutional equilibrium, especially in the form of an exogenous and stable non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU). By focusing on demand and distribution, PK authors argue that the NAIRU underlying the new-Keynesian, three equation analysis of employment and inflation, is endogenous and unstable due to different mechanisms. This can be due to the fact that the level of employment will depend on the capital stock and with imperfect substitution between capital and labour as argued by Rowthorn (1995) and Arestis and Sawyer (2005) or the fact that labour productivity is endogenous by Storm and Naastepad (2015).\textsuperscript{25} Finally, PKE incorporates money and finance into its analysis as essential features of crises. In the first place money is endogenously created by commercial banks and the lending decisions of banks play an important role during crises as bank lending tends to be highly pro-cyclical, amplifying asset-price booms that can trap an economy in a debt or liquidity crisis. Unlike orthodox theory which recommends deflationary policies, post-Keynesians consider the impact of inflation on demand expansionary since it alleviates the real debt burden of firms in a situation of debt overhang, whereas deflation has contractionary effects.

The recent debate on the inclusion of macroeconomics in the analysis of comparative political economy reveals important theoretical differences between new-Keynesian and post-Keynesian macroeconomics and questions Hope and Soskice’s (2016) claim that the growth model approach is not inconsistent with their VoC approach. The focus on demand and distri-
bution by post-Keynesian economics endogeneizes the NAIRU and ques-
tions the implicit assumption of a profit-led demand regime by the VoC
analyses. Moreover, the focus on finance by PK authors highlights the in-
herent unsustainability of the growth models due to increasing debt-in-
come ratios and financial fragility. In other words, the post-Keynesian and
New Keynesian macroeconomic theory underlying comparative capitalism
analyses are radically different and lead to different conclusions regarding
the sustainability of different types of growth models/varieties of capitalism
in an economic and monetary union.

7. Conclusion

While there are some superficial similarities between VoC and post-
Keynesian analyses of the Euro crisis, we also find profound analytical dif-
fferences. The similarity is in the country grouping and the characterization
of northern European countries as export-led. The Mediterranean Market
Economy typology in the VoC literature roughly corresponds to the south-
ern debt-driven growth models in the post-Keynesian literature. The
post-Keynesian export-driven growth model of the North is classified as
Coordinated Market Economy by VoC. However, the macroeconomic ex-
planation of the Euro crisis differs substantially. VoC analysis essentially
regards the Euro crisis as crisis of competitiveness, which has been
caused due to different sets of labour market institutions giving rise to cur-
rent account imbalances. Financial factors, central bank policy and fiscal
policy play a secondary (if any) role in VoC analysis. This contrasts with
the post-Keynesian approach. Here the divergence of competitiveness is
regarded as a contributing factor, but not the core of the explanation. First,
financial factors play a more prominent role. The real estate boom and the
associated credit boom in the southern European countries is interpreted
as a result of financial liberalization. It was southern European growth that
pulled in German imports. There is a simple point here: if the main story
were the loss of competitiveness of the South, we would expect higher
growth in the North than in the South. However, what we observe is that
(prior to the crisis) Germany was growing more slowly than the southern
European countries. Related to this is an important issue: the notion of
capital flows as recycling of the (German and Northern) trade surpluses.
While some recycling did take place, this metaphor is overall misleading:
Neither would German trade surpluses have existed (to the same extent)
without the southern financial bubble, nor do capital flows originate from
trade surplus. Hale and Obstfeld (2016, p. 1) document that “core EMU
countries took on extra foreign leverage to expose themselves to the pe-
ripherals.” In fact much of the (gross) capital flows originate from the USA
and UK, which are the major international financial centres, but have themselves sizable trade deficits. Fernandez and Garcia (2018) highlight a chain of credit relations, with the Anglo-Saxon financial centres at the core, northern European countries and France in the middle and the southern Europe as the borrowers.

The second important difference between VoC and post-Keynesians is the insistence of the latter that fiscal and monetary policy play a crucial role. Troika-imposed austerity turned the recession in the southern European countries into something akin to the Great Depression. Stockhammer et al (2019) present evidence that a substantial part of the different performance between North and South is in fact due to different fiscal policies. However, the most important single factor to understand why in parts of Europe the global financial crisis turned into a sovereign debt crisis, but not in the USA or the UK, was the lack of central bank support for southern European countries. The ECB refused to play the lender of last resort for the Euro member states while the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England engaged in quantitative easing that ultimately involved massive buying of government bonds. Conversely, what ended the Euro crisis was that, belatedly, the ECB did commit to defending the integrity of the Euro, which implies the support to sovereign debt. What becomes visible here is that VoC’s macroeconomic basis and in particular its theory of finance is weak.

These analytical differences are reflected in policy conclusions. While some VoC authors have called for demand expansion in the North and more space to fiscal policy,27 the VoC analysis of the Euro-crisis overall lends itself to a dismal conclusion, where within the existing institutional framework little can be done to improve things.Unless countries fundamentally reform their labour market institutions (which is unlikely to happen because that is main source of their institutional comparative advantage) the common currency cannot work. What is more, according to VoC analysis the fiscal and monetary policy preferences of coordinated, liberal and mixed market economies are deeply ingrained and, according to Iversen et al (2016), were part of their rational preference for joining the common currency area with its given policy architecture. From the perspective of post-Keynesian macroeconomics, such a conclusion does not stand up to close scrutiny since post-Keynesians have always emphasized there is an alternative to the current course of action chosen by the Troika,28 In particular, establishing a common sovereign assets (e.g. Euro bonds) and an effective lender of last resort for the private as well as the public sector are essential for currency area. The Euro area presently lacks these.

Thus while there are some similarities between the VoC and the PK analysis of the Euro crisis, there are also substantial theoretical differences. We think that the Euro crisis has laid bare the weak macroeconomic foundations of VoC and its lack of an adequate treatment of finance. It is thus
encouraging that there is growing interest within comparative political economy of Post-Keynesian themes such as demand regimes and financialisation.

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Endnotes
1 See Hall and Soskice (2001) for the seminal introduction of the Varieties of Capitalism approach.
2 The southern economies have received less attention in the literature and have been conceptualized more recently than their counterparts CME’s and LME’s. It is interesting to note that MME’s are more often than not defined in negation to the CME countries i.e. they lack institutional capacities that promote export competitiveness. See Molina and Rhodes (2007) and Hassel (2014).
3 See Hall and Gingerich (2009) for an empirical account of institutional complementarity in the spheres of industrial relations and corporate governance across different varieties of capitalism.
4 See Iversen et al. (2016) for an elaborate VoC account of the reasons for these economies to join EMU.
5 See Nolke, (2016) for a survey of the literature on three generations of comparative political economy scholarship and their explanation of the Euro crisis.
6 The following are important VoC studies on the Euro crisis: Boltho and Carlin (2013); Hancke (2013b); Hall (2014); Hassel (2014); Hopner and Lutter (2014); Johnston et al. (2014); Johnston and Regan (2015); Iversen and Soskice (2013); Iversen et al. (2016).
7 Iversen and Soskice (2013) argue the political equilibrium between insiders in the formal sector and outsiders in the informal sector is established through clientilistic networks and weak political parties that cater to narrow lobbies and constituencies. Hall and Gingerich (2009) argue that these political economies reflect a legacy of high state intervention as a political adjustment mechanism.
8 See Molina and Rhodes (2007), Hassel (2014) and (Hall 2018) for a detailed account of institutional foundations of MME’s and political and economic adjustment in these economies.
10 See King (2002) for a history of post-Keynesian economics since 1936.
11 Hysteresis refers to persistence of effects after the initial causes have disappeared. More technically it means that the NAIRU responds to changes in actual unemployment (Stockhammer 2008).
12 Lavoie, Stockhammer (2013).
14 Epstein (2005) defines financialization as “the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies”. Nikolaidi and Stockhammer (2017) offer a survey of Minskyan models.
16 Hein (2013) classifies France, Italy and Portugal as domestic demand-led growth models whereas Stockhammer et al, (2016a) characterize Italy and Portugal as debt driven.
17 The capital inflows in Eurozone debtor countries originated from the North, France, the Anglo-Saxon countries and international financial centres like Luxembourg following the creation of a single currency (Hale and Obstfeld 2016; Fernandez and Garcia 2018;
The capital flows originated in part from countries that had themselves current account deficits, thus they cannot be overall characterized as “recycled”.

18 Hein (2013), Stockhammer (2016).
19 Stockhammer et al. (2016a). Here, North includes Austria, Germany and Netherlands, whereas the South includes Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Ireland and Spain stand out with massive increases in household debt and prices.
20 Weeks (2014).
21 Arestis et al. (2001); Hein, Truger (2005); Bibow (2007).
23 Lavoie, Stockhammer (2013).
24 See Carlin and Sockice (2014) for a complete exposition of the new-Keynesian macroeconomic model.
25 Some of the other PK arguments for the endogeneity of the NAIRU are that profit claims would be affected by the interest rate since an increase in the interest rate not only affects actual unemployment, but also the NAIRU as argued by Hein (2006) or due to wage norms are argued by Skott (2005).
26 Ireland is often classified as a Liberal Market Economy by VoC and thus one of the few countries where the classification would differ.
27 Hall (2018); Johnston, Regan (2016).
28 Hein (2013).

Abstract

The 2008 global financial crisis that began in the US housing sector mutated into a sovereign debt crisis and an economic depression for countries in southern Europe, threatening the very existence of the Eurozone. The paper contrasts analyses of the Euro crisis based on the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach and post-Keynesian analysis. The VoC analysis has argued that the euro crisis is ultimately a crisis of incompatible institutional settings, in particular wage bargaining institutions, tied together in a monetary union. The Mediterranean Market Economies lack the institutional capacities to restrain wage growth. The Coordinated Market Economies (in northern Europe) have managed to maintain modest wage growth and inflation because export-oriented sectors play the role of wage leader. Post-Keynesian analysis has interpreted the crisis as the outcome of the unsustainable growth models and neoliberal policies in Europe; i.e. a neo-mercantilist export-led demand regime in the North and a debt-driven demand regime in the South and the EMU policies of financial deregulation that accompanied European economic integration. What is specific to the Euro area is the absence of adequate central fiscal stabilization or effective lender of last resort facility for the member countries. The ECB was hesitant in its unconventional monetary policy and began buying government bonds of countries under pressure only at a late stage of the crises. The imbalances resulted in a full blown sovereign debt crisis. We argue that the VoC analysis has important shortcomings as it focuses excessively on labour market institutions and that the post-Keynesian approach integrates financial factors and economic policy in explaining the crisis.
Zusammenfassung


Key words: Varieties of Capitalism, post-Keynesian economics, Euro crisis
JEL Classifications: B00, E02, E12, E60, F45, G01, P50